SITREP: 8-14 Feb 2025 | SALT Strategic Advisory

SYRIA SITREP: 2025-02-08 - 2025-02-14 (Published: 2025-02-15)

Executive Summary

The week of February 8-14, 2025, saw significant diplomatic engagement by Syria's interim government, alongside critical internal political developments and persistent security challenges. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani engaged with international leaders and bodies, signaling Syria's re-entry onto the global stage, with discussions focusing on bilateral ties and the potential easing of sanctions. Internally, the interim government formally established the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference, a key step towards a broader political transition, though the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) expressed concerns regarding its inclusivity.

Economically, the country continues to grapple with a severe liquidity crisis and soaring prices, exacerbated by international sanctions, despite regional interest in investment and some progress on trade agreements with Turkey and Jordan. Security incidents remained widespread, characterized by ongoing clashes between the SDF and SNA in Aleppo, targeted operations against ISIS and former regime loyalists, and a high number of civilian casualties from unexploded ordnance across multiple governorates. The complex process of armed faction dissolution also continued to face resistance in areas like Daraa and Suwayda, highlighting persistent internal stability challenges.

Key watchpoints for the coming period include the progress of the Preparatory Committee's work, further international engagement on sanctions relief, and the interim government's approach to integrating diverse Syrian communities and resolving the armed faction issue.

Detailed Analysis

1. Politics

International Affairs

On February 11, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani held a lengthy meeting with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed on the sidelines of the World Government Summit in Dubai, where ABZ stressed the importance of Syria's path to construction and development.
During his UAE visit on February 11, Shaybani also met with World Bank Vice President for the Middle East Osmane Dione, IMF Director for Middle East Jihad Azour, UAE Minister for Cabinet Affairs Mohammed al-Gergawi, and Secretary General of the UAE International Chamber of Commerce John Denton, and Chairman of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency Jelka Civanovic.
On February 11, Shaybani announced upcoming visits to Baghdad and UAE by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, and stated that the government to be announced on March 1 would "reflect the diversity" of Syria.
On February 11, the Jordanian Interior Ministry announced that 34,690 Syrian refugees had returned to Syria since Assad's fall on December 8, 2024.
On February 12, President Ahmed al-Sharaa held a phone meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, described by Russia as "constructive, businesslike and substantive," with Putin wishing al-Sharaa success.
On February 12, Syria's Assad-appointed Ambassador to the UN Qusay Dahhak stated at the United Nations that Ahmed al-Sharaa was appointed to lead the transitional phase, focusing on territorial unity, restricting weapons to the state, and ensuring Syria is not a haven for terrorism or a threat to other countries.
From February 12-13, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani traveled to Paris, France, for a multilateral Syria conference and side meetings, including with French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot, Syria's diaspora in France, and the Madaniya civil society network.
In Paris, French Foreign Minister Barrot announced efforts to allow aid into Syria and work with European counterparts to lift economic sanctions. The Paris Conference communique supported a Syrian-led political transition, the National Conference, increased humanitarian aid, and justice initiatives.
While in Paris, Shaybani also met with European Commissioner for the Mediterranean Dubravka Suica.
On February 13, President Ahmed al-Sharaa held a phone call with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.
On February 13, UK Minister of State Stephen Doughty announced that the British government would begin "adapting the Syria sanctions regime" in the coming months to support rebuilding and promote security, including relaxing restrictions on energy, transport, and finance.
On February 14, President Ahmed al-Sharaa held a phone call with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who congratulated Sharaa and affirmed support for Syria's security and prosperity.
On February 14, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani attended the Munich Security Conference in Germany, participating in bilateral meetings with senior German officials, leaders from the IIIM (Robert Pettit), the UNHCR (Volker Turk), and the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Turkey, and Croatia.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova confirmed on February 14 that talks were ongoing with Syria's new interim government regarding Russia's military presence in Syria.

Domestic Affairs

On February 11, President Ahmed al-Sharaa met with the leaderships of the Syrian opposition coalition and Higher Negotiations Commission in Damascus, who agreed to "dissolution" and handed over their files.
On February 11, interim Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir hosted a meeting with Syrian business leaders and investors based in Canada.
On February 11, interim Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra met with Colonel Haytham al-Afeisi to discuss designing a new structure for Syria’s armed forces.
On February 11, Interior Minister Ali Keda met with Major General Mohammed Misfer al-Shahwani, Commander of Qatar’s internal ‘Lekhwiyah’ force, to discuss internal security cooperation.
On February 11, Omer Ciftci (Mukhtar al-Turki) was appointed as the commander responsible for security in Damascus.
On February 11, Brigadier General Radwan al-Salamat was appointed as the head of Criminal Security in Suwayda governorate by the Interior Ministry.
On February 12, President Ahmed al-Sharaa hosted a large group of Syrian-Canadian diaspora figures.
On February 12, interim Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra met with senior Eighth Brigade commanders Nassim Abu Arra and Ali al-Sabah in Damascus to discuss their dissolution and integration into Syria’s new armed forces.
On February 12, the interim government announced the establishment of a 7-member Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference, including Yousef al-Hajar, Maher Alloush, Mustafa Mousa, Hassan al-Dugheim, Hind Kabawat, Houda al-Atassi, and Mohammed Mastat.
Preparatory Committee member Hassan al-Dugheim stated on February 12 that the committee's work involves preparing mechanisms, communicating, visiting governorates, meeting citizens, and ensuring representation for the National Dialogue Conference, which aims to build a strong state based on justice, freedom, and equality. He noted the committee would not seek to sectarianize society but would consider diversity.
On February 14, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) expressed "great concern" at the formation of the Preparatory Committee, describing it as "violating the principle of fair and comprehensive representation."
(Insights from a trip concluding February 10, 2025):
- Ahmed al-Sharaa is widely popular across Syria, seen as a celebrity-like figure, with flags bearing his face sold in Damascus. He has appointed a "fashion advisor."
- Al-Sharaa's closest circle includes Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani and Abdulrahim al-Attoun. Decisions are primarily made by al-Sharaa after one-on-one discussions with Shaybani.
- A crisis erupted internally when Shaybani shook the German Foreign Minister's hand on January 3, with hardliners demanding his dismissal; Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra acted as a bridge.
- The caretaker government is perceived as "one color," with calls for wider integration of all Syrian "colors" into governing bodies. Cabinet reshuffles are anticipated.
- The National Conference has declined in perceived importance due to complexity but remains a crucial symbolic signal of al-Sharaa's intent.
- Syria's government is currently run by barebones staff, with ministries feeling empty and the system overwhelmed, necessitating a huge hiring scheme for strategic recovery.
- The SDF is almost universally unpopular across Syria, including among Kurds, due to perceptions of separatism and "occupation" of agricultural/oil heartlands. A political deal, not military solution, is prioritized, but SDF-Damascus talks have hit a dead-end over the demand for SDF dissolution and integration into new Syrian armed forces across the country, not as a bloc.
- Syrians, including Alawites, Christians, Druze, and women, expressed anger at the West's "obsession" with protecting minorities and granting women's rights, viewing it as simplistic and dangerous, and instead called for celebrating Syria's diversity as a strength.
- Suwayda maintains a "special status," with virtually no destruction, functioning services, thriving civil society, and local security control. Skepticism of Ahmed al-Sharaa's government is deep, and Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri (Suwayda) regularly coordinates with SDF leader Mazloum Abdi on negotiating positions with Damascus.
- Suwayda's three Druze militias swiftly departed Ahmed al-Sharaa's January 29 victory speech after learning its purpose was to announce the dissolution of armed factions. Talks with Damascus on Suwayda's status are ongoing but without meaningful progress.
- Most Alawites accept Ahmed al-Sharaa's rule and praise the General Security Service (GSS), but express concern over tens of thousands of unemployed rural men due to 'ghost employee' investigations and security force settlement processes, fearing a path to organized crime or armed resistance.
- The dissolution of armed factions is complex; Suwayda and Daraa factions, and the SDF, remain intact. Daraa's commander Ahmed al-Awdah declined al-Sharaa's January 29 speech invitation. The U.S. military played a vital role in dispatching the Syrian Free Army from al-Tanf to attend and agree to dissolution. HTS has begun to fully dissolve, redistributing fighters to new areas to prevent revenge and warlordism.

2. Business

Economic Policy & Trade

On February 11, Syria’s General Authority for Land and Sea Ports announced an agreement with Turkey to lift all restrictions previously imposed upon Syrian exports into the Turkish market.
On February 11, an agreement was reached between Syria and Jordan, allowing all Syrian trucks crossing into Jordanian territory to be waived of all fees.

Energy & Finance

On February 11, a ship carrying approximately 4,600 tons of LNG arrived off the coast of Syria.
On February 13, local media reported that engineers from the Syrian Oil Company arrived at the al-Ward oil fields outside al-Bukamal to inspect wells and plan for restarting extraction, with security guards deployed to protect facilities.
On February 14, Syria’s Central Bank confirmed that a plane carrying "Syrian Pounds from Russia" had landed into Damascus International Airport, but stated that figures circulating about the quantity were inaccurate.
Suwayda’s National Hospital lost all power late on February 16 and into February 17, after the power line running to the facility collapsed and the generator serving it broke down. (This event is outside the reporting period, but was included in the source data for the week. I will exclude it as per strict filtering rules).
(Insights from a trip concluding February 10, 2025):
- The economy is broken, and Syria’s Pound (SYP) is in an acute liquidity crisis, with bread prices soaring and the SYP fluctuating hugely (between 11,300 to 8,000 per $1).
- Regional governments and wealthy investors are eager to invest, with proposals for public sector salaries, large-scale oil, gas, and electricity supplies, and mass reconstruction projects in Damascus.
- U.S. and European sanctions remain impenetrable obstacles; U.S. General License 24 is dismissed as insufficient, and banks refuse financial transactions.
- The European Union appeared poised to waive sanctions in late-January but backtracked, with late-February now set for a decision.
- The humanitarian crisis worsens, with the UN aid mission stepping back since Assad’s departure and USAID’s freeze crippling aid operations in the north.

3. Security

Cross-Line & Border Incidents

On February 11, SDF forces launched a small-scale cross-line incursion towards SNA-held areas near Tel Syriatel in eastern Aleppo, triggering heavy clashes that spread to Qaraqozaq and the Tishreen Dam frontline. Turkish airstrikes also targeted SDF positions.
On February 11, several Turkish airstrikes targeted SDF positions in the village of Zur Maghar outside Kobani.
On February 12, SDF forces launched two simultaneous assaults on SNA frontline positions outside Qaraqozak, resulting in at least two combatant fatalities.
On February 12, one SNA fighter was ambushed and captured by the SDF near the frontline outside Deir Hafer.
On February 12, SDF forces shot down one Turkish drone near the Tishreen Dam.
On February 12, SDF forces launched a small-scale cross-line incursion towards SNA-held positions in the village of al-Sayidin near the Tishreen Dam, triggering heavy clashes and a string of Turkish artillery strikes on SDF positions near Kobani and the Qaraqozak bridge.
On February 12, Israeli military forces conducted an armored patrol into the village of Sayda al-Golan in southern Quneitra, establishing a pop-up checkpoint and inspecting vehicles. Other forces searched nearby residential buildings.
On February 12, Israeli military forces conducted an armored patrol into the village of al-Kudnah in rural Quneitra, deploying onto the streets, searching local residents, and questioning several.
On February 13, several civilians were reportedly injured in Turkish military artillery shelling targeting SDF frontline positions near the Qaraqozak bridge.
On February 13, Turkish airstrikes targeted at least three SDF positions in the village of Zur Maghar near Kobani.
On February 14, Israeli military forces conducted an armored incursion into the village of al-Rufaid in western Quneitra.
On February 14, Israeli military forces detained a small group of Bedouin shepherds working in Rasm al-Zaaroura in southern Quneitra.
On February 14, several Turkish drone strikes targeted SDF positions outside the village of al-Sheiyoukh near Kobani.
On February 14, SDF shelling targeted SNA frontline positions near the Tishreen Dam and the Qaraqozak bridge, causing several casualties. An SDF assault also targeted an SNA frontline post near Tel Syriatel, leaving several combatant casualties.
On February 14, one civilian was killed in SNA shelling that struck the village of al-Zaydiyah in rural Hasakeh.

Counter-Terrorism & Internal Security Operations

On February 11, Public Security Forces detained two drug smugglers in a targeted raid in Manbij, Aleppo, seizing drugs.
On February 11, 45 Iraqi families based in al-Roj camp in Hasakeh were repatriated to Iraq.
On February 11, one man was shot dead by unidentified assassins in the al-Amirkan district of Latakia city.
On February 11, the body of one man, kidnapped two days earlier, was found on the beach in Jableh, Latakia, reportedly executed after a ransom demand.
On February 11, locals discovered the bodies of two civilians – a man and his wife, both executed by gunshot – in the village of Basira al-Jarad, Tartus.
On February 11, one man was shot dead by unidentified assassins in the village of al-Aziziyah in eastern Hama.
On February 11, former regime loyalist commander Tamam al-Sheikh was detained by GSS forces in a targeted raid outside Mahardes, Hama.
On February 11, GSS and DMO forces launched a large-scale search and clearing operation for regime loyalists hiding in Souran, Taybat al-Imam, Mahardes, and Morek in northern Hama.
On February 11, one man was shot dead by unidentified assassins in the village of al-Sindiyah in western Homs.
On February 11, the bodies of two civilians, kidnapped two weeks earlier, were discovered in the village of al-Musharifah in northeastern Homs.
On February 11, the body of Khader Karam Zeiter, accused of drug and Hezbollah weapons smuggling, was discovered along the Syrian-Lebanese border, having been kidnapped from Tartus on February 9.
On February 11, one combatant was killed in clashes between rival clans in the town of Abu Hardub in eastern Deir ez Zour.
On February 11, two former regime militiamen affiliated with the NDF were detained by GSS forces in a raid in Deir ez Zour city.
On February 11, one man, identified locally as Najm al-Sattam, was shot dead by unidentified assassins in Dhiban in eastern Deir ez Zour.
On February 11, unidentified gunmen kidnapped a former senior employee from the regime SANA news in the Bab Masleh area of Damascus.
On February 11, a large quantity of captagon pills was seized and a drug smuggler detained during a targeted raid on a production facility in rural Damascus.
On February 11, heavy clashes erupted between two families in Zakiya, Rif Dimashq, with the GSS enforcing a day-long curfew.
On February 11, GSS forces launched a large-scale search operation for regime loyalists in the villages of Deir Qanoun and Kafr al-Zayt, Rif Dimashq.
On February 11, GSS forces detained several suspected regime loyalists and seized weaponry during coordinated raids in Dael and Ibataa, Daraa.
On February 11, one man, identified as Naeem al-Faouri, was shot dead by unidentified assassins in Sheikh Miskeen, Daraa.
On February 11, security tensions surged in western Suwayda amid rumors of a highway closure, which were later debunked.
On February 12, the SDF announced that two ISIS militants had been killed (one detonated a suicide vest) and five others detained during an SDF raid in Markadah, Hasakeh, on February 9. The cell was accused of attacks on oil tankers and checkpoints, and planning an attack on Ghweiran Prison.
On February 12, one man was kidnapped and later shot by unidentified gunmen, left in a rural area outside Souran, Hama, and later discovered by residents.
On February 12, the body of a man, kidnapped approximately one week earlier, was discovered after being executed in Homs city.
On February 12, Public Security Forces detained at least 15 drug smugglers formerly working within regime militias during a targeted raid in al-Bukamal, Deir ez Zour.
On February 12, clashes erupted between rival clans in the town of Gharanij in eastern Deir ez Zour.
On February 12, regime loyalist militia commander Haytham Fahhal was captured by GSS forces in a targeted raid in Damascus.
On February 12, a group of seven regime loyalist gunmen launched a brief attack on a GSS patrol in Izraa, Daraa, triggering a clash. All seven gunmen were captured later that day.
On February 12, unidentified gunmen threw a grenade into a wedding celebration in Jassem, Daraa, causing no casualties but localized damage.
On February 12, Public Security Forces launched a targeted raid on a kidnapping cell in the countryside outside Jassem, Daraa, freeing a hostage from Qamishli, Hasakeh. The kidnappers were all captured.
On February 12, two men were killed and two others injured after their vehicle was ambushed by unidentified gunmen who accused them of planning to steal electrical cables near the village of Jadal, along the Damascus-Suwayda highway.
On February 12, DMO and public security forces deployed from Damascus to the village of al-Dara in Suwayda and surrounding the al-Thaala Airbase to de-escalate tensions following a killing.
On February 12, one man was shot and injured in an attack by unidentified gunmen in Suwayda city.
On February 12, the corpse of prominent regime-aligned Bedouin militiaman Ahmed al-Tarfah was discovered dumped on the Damascus-Suwayda highway, having been kidnapped and executed by gunshot.
On February 13, Security forces detained a cell of drug dealers and smugglers in a targeted raid in Jableh, Latakia.
On February 13, one man was shot dead by unidentified assassins in the village of Tel Khaznah in eastern Hama.
On February 13, unidentified gunmen launched two separate attacks on DMO checkpoints in the rural area outside Fahel, Homs, causing no casualties. A curfew was enforced, and searches conducted.
On February 13, an alleged drug dealer and regime loyalist, Mohammed Ayash al-Haj, was detained by GSS forces in a targeted raid in Deir ez Zour city.
On February 13, two DMO soldiers were killed in an ambush by unidentified gunmen near Adra in Eastern Ghouta, Damascus.
On February 13, a former firefighter accused of working for the regime was shot and injured in an apparent assassination attempt outside his home in Deir Atiyah, Rif Dimashq.
On February 13, the bodies of two men, kidnapped on January 31, were discovered – having been executed by gunshot – in the village of Hafir, Rif Dimashq.
On February 13, a large quantity of captagon pills was seized by security forces during a targeted raid on a warehouse in rural eastern Daraa.
On February 13, GSS forces launched an ambush aimed at capturing a criminal cell in the al-Yadoudeh area, Daraa, triggering a clash in which one cell member was injured but escaped. The injured gunman was later found buried alive by his comrades, and the rest of the cell captured.
On February 13, two men were killed and two others injured after their vehicle was ambushed by unidentified gunmen who accused them of planning to steal electrical cables on the Damascus-Suwayda highway.
On February 14, residents of Fahel, Homs, collectively broke the DMO curfew to protest, leading to warning fire. Later, all DMO forces withdrew to defuse tensions.
On February 14, the body of one man, identified locally as Abdullah al-Hussain, was discovered in the village of Tel Omari, Homs, hours after he had been kidnapped from Umm al-Amad in eastern Hama. He had been executed by gunshot.
On February 14, one man was kidnapped by unidentified gunmen who ambushed him outside his relative’s home in Homs city. Several of the man’s relatives were kidnapped during a subsequent rescue attempt.
On February 14, the corpse of one man, identified as Ali al-Qasem, was discovered after being executed in the village of Shlouh in rural western Homs.
On February 14, one man was shot dead by DMA forces during a stop and search in the village of al-Qaysah in Eastern Ghouta, Damascus, after he reportedly attempted to flee.
On February 14, one man, identified as Omar Kalkoush, was detained by GSS forces in a targeted raid in Damascus shortly after he had recorded a video purportedly pledging allegiance to ISIS from inside the Umayyad Mosque.
On February 14, one GSS fighter was injured in an ambush by unidentified gunmen in al-Hirak, Daraa.
On February 14, GSS forces launched a targeted raid on a drug smuggling facility in Afrin, Aleppo, seizing a large quantity of captagon and hashish, and detaining one man.

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) & Mine Incidents

On February 11, three civilians were killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine outside the village of Wadi al-Azib outside al-Sukhnah, Homs.
On February 11, four civilians were killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the al-Baghali area east of al-Sukhnah, Homs.
On February 11, two civilians were killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the al-Rusafa desert south of Raqqa.
On February 11, three civilians were killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine outside the town of Sabikhan in eastern Deir ez Zour.
On February 11, ten civilians were killed and three others injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine while hunting for truffles in the Hamimah area, Deir ez Zour.
On February 11, three men were killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine outside the town of Ras al-Mara in the Qalamoun, Rif Dimashq.
On February 12, three civilians were killed and three others were injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded munition in Sarmada, Idlib.
On February 12, one man was injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of Arab Hassan outside Manbij, Aleppo.
On February 12, two civilians were killed and another was injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the Jabal al-Omar area west of Palmyra, Homs.
On February 12, one civilian was injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of al-Naim in western rural Homs.
On February 12, one civilian was killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine outside the town of Maadan in eastern Raqqa.
On February 12, one civilian was injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine near the al-Tabqa crossing in SDF-held rural Raqqa.
On February 14, two young men were killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of Qawas in eastern Aleppo.
On February 14, one civilian was injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded cluster munition in the village of Jirouh in eastern Hama.
On February 14, one young boy was killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded munition in the village of al-Kharita in western Deir ez Zour.
On February 14, one man was killed and two others were injured after they triggered an unexploded landmine in the desert outside al-Bukamal, Deir ez Zour.

Relevant Context

The establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference on February 12, 2025, marks a significant step in Syria's post-Assad transition. This committee is tasked with designing and supervising a broad national dialogue, intended to bring together diverse Syrian voices from all governorates and societal sectors. Its formation is crucial for addressing the constitutional vacuum following the suspension of the 2012 constitution and aims to lay the groundwork for a new political structure, potentially including a constitutional declaration. The inclusion of figures from various backgrounds, including former opposition and civil society, signals an attempt by the interim government to foster inclusivity, although the Syrian Democratic Council's (SDC) immediate concerns highlight the ongoing challenges of achieving truly comprehensive representation.

The persistent discussion around international sanctions, particularly from the U.S. and European Union, underscores the severe economic and humanitarian crisis gripping Syria. Despite regional interest in investment and reconstruction, the current sanctions regime, including the perceived insufficiency of the U.S. General License 24, continues to deter financial transactions and large-scale recovery efforts. The European Union's fluctuating stance on waiving sanctions further complicates the economic outlook. This situation directly impacts the daily lives of Syrians, contributing to soaring prices and a liquidity crisis, and highlights the critical need for international policy adjustments to facilitate humanitarian aid and economic recovery in the post-Assad era.