SITREP: 18-24 Jan 2025 | SALT Strategic Advisory

SYRIA SITREP: 2025-01-18 - 2025-01-24 (Published: 2025-01-25)

Executive Summary

The week of January 18-24, 2025, witnessed significant diplomatic and security developments across Syria. The transitional government actively engaged on the international stage, with Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani participating in the World Economic Forum at Davos and meeting with the Saudi Foreign Minister, who called for the urgent lifting of sanctions. Bilateral talks also occurred with Belarus and Turkey, focusing on economic cooperation and trade. Domestically, negotiations between the HTS-led transitional government and the SDF continued, with the government offering a decentralized governance system and recognition of Kurdish rights, though the SDF reportedly rejected key terms, particularly regarding military integration.

Security remained a primary concern, marked by escalating SNA-SDF hostilities in Aleppo, particularly around the Tishreen Dam, involving Turkish airstrikes and SDF drone attacks, causing civilian casualties. Critically, US intelligence sharing with the HTS-led General Security Service (GSS) reportedly foiled a major ISIS plot in Damascus, highlighting a new level of counter-terrorism cooperation. Meanwhile, regime loyalist activity surged in Latakia and Tartus, prompting significant DMO security operations and arrests. The transitional government continued efforts to integrate armed factions into a new national army and expand its control, notably over oil wells in Raqqa and other desert areas.

Key watchpoints include the trajectory of HTS-SDF negotiations and the potential for increased conflict in the northeast, as well as the sustained efforts to stabilize areas formerly under regime control amidst ongoing loyalist resistance and the persistent threat of ISIS and unexploded ordnance.

Detailed Analysis

1. Politics

International Affairs

On January 22, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani participated in the World Economic Forum at Davos, including a one-on-one panel with former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, where he stressed the need for sanctions to be lifted and Syria’s economy to be open to foreign investments.
On January 22, Interim Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir hosted a senior delegation from the World Health Organization (WHO), led by Dr. Hanan Balkhi, Dr. Ahmed Zoueiten, and Ms. Christina Bethke. The delegation later met with interim Minister of Health, Dr. Maher al-Sharaa.
On January 22, the Vice President of Turkey’s leading AK Party, Zafer Sirkaya, visited Aleppo, meeting with interim governor Azzam Gharib.
On January 23, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa and Intelligence chief Anas Khattab hosted a visiting delegation from Belarus, led by Foreign Minister Maksim Rzhinkov, in Damascus. Rzhinkov announced discussions on organizing the assembly of buses and agricultural machinery in Syria, with 50 MAZ buses to be sent within three months, and readiness to continue humanitarian programs and provide education opportunities for Syrian students in Belarusian universities.
On January 23, the Chief of Staff of Syria’s Armed Forces, Major General Ali al-Naasan, hosted Brigadier General Michel Boutros, the Lebanese Armed Forces’ Director for Cooperation and Coordination, in Damascus for meetings on securing the Syrian-Lebanese border.
On January 23, Governor of Aleppo Azzam al-Gharib welcomed a delegation from UN OCHA, led by William Nagzi and Hiba Hanano.
On January 24, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan visited Damascus and met with HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani, stressing the importance of urgently lifting all sanctions imposed on Syria.
On January 22, UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen stressed in Damascus that there is a strong international consensus for supporting the new Syria and that the political transition must succeed. Pedersen identified seven challenges: integrating armed factions into a national army, challenges in the Northeast, protection of all Syrians, political transition, transitional justice, sanctions/economic recovery/reconstruction, and the Israeli presence.

Domestic Affairs

On January 21, Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra confirmed that negotiations with the SDF are continuing, stating that the SDF had offered control of oil but it was declined. Qasra declared that ongoing talks with the SDF were focused on state institutions, border control, countering ISIS, dealing with ISIS prisons, and potential redeployment of Turkish forces.
On January 21, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani wrote on “X” in Arabic and Kurdish that Kurds add diversity to the Syrian people and that the Kurdish community was wronged by the Assad regime, pledging to build a country where everyone feels equal and just. SDF and SDC leader Elham Ahmed appeared to respond, stating that Kurds would contribute to Syrian society when basic law guarantees their rights, aiming to create a new diverse and decentralized Syria.
On January 22, Minister of Defense Murhaf Abu Qasra appointed Colonel Binyan Ahmed al-Hariri as the commander of Syria’s southern Houran region.
On January 22, Dr. Yasser al-Huwaysh was appointed as the Dean of the Faculty of Law at Damascus University. Dr. Ali Kanaan was also appointed as the new Dean of the Faculty of Economics, and Dr. Iman Ezz as Dean of the Faculty of Education.
On January 23, Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra convened a meeting with the leaders of Syria’s central and eastern tribes in Damascus to discuss the integration of their regions into interim government control and recruitment from their communities.
On January 23, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa commented on the Kurdish question, stating they are considering negotiating with the SDF to find a middle ground, acknowledging past injustices against Kurds, and insisting all weapons must be in the hands of the state, opposing PKK Units for threatening Turkey.
On January 23, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani confirmed he was in contact with the Trump administration and hoped sanctions on Syria would be lifted.
An Al Jazeera article (published outside the reporting period, but citing events within) claimed on January 26 that the interim government had submitted an offer to the SDF to resolve the crisis in northeast Syria, including recognizing Kurdish language and cultural rights, inclusion in a new constitution, and a decentralized governance system. However, the SDF reportedly rejected the offer, insisting on joining Syria’s military as a contiguous “unit” within its current areas and shared oil revenues, which Damascus rejected.
A January 22 report, "Approaching Zero Hour – Can Syria unify & avoid major conflict with the SDF?", detailed that HTS-SDF negotiations had made little progress, with HTS affirming Kurdish official language status and equal rights, but the SDF demanding to remain a distinct “military bloc” deployed only in the northeast, which HTS insisted was a red line. Syria’s interim Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra warned of a new “civil war” if a deal is not soon reached.

2. Business

Economic Reforms and Trade Resumption

On January 21, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani announced intentions to privatize state ports and factories and invite foreign investment to enhance Syria’s capacity to trade at strategic levels.
On January 22, Syria’s Ministry of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection mandated it illegal to move or trade state-subsidized flour from one governorate to another without a formal permission document.
On January 22, the General Authority for Land and Sea Ports announced that production equipment and machines were to be made exempt from customs duties along Syria’s borders to incentivize investment in manufacturing and small business.
In an interview with the Financial Times published on January 22, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani underlined that the transitional government is prioritizing economic development and noted that Assad’s regime built up more than $30 billion of debt to Iran and Russia.
On January 22, Saudi cement company Al-Jouf Cement signed a $10.1 million contract to provide Syria with cement between February 2025 and February 2026.
On January 23, Syria’s Central Bank issued a decree freezing the bank accounts of all companies and individuals formerly associated with Assad’s regime.
News emerged on January 23 that the Syrian government had severed a contract previously held with Russian firm STG Stroytransgaz to manage the commercial side of the Tartus Port.
The Turkish Trade Ministry announced on January 24 that a delegation led by Deputy Minister Mustafa Tuzcu had traveled to Syria to discuss trade, customs duties, and a roadmap to revive strategic levels of bilateral trade, agreeing to initiate negotiations to revive the Turkey-Syria Free Trade Agreement suspended in 2011.

Infrastructure Development

On January 21, a solar cell array was installed and initiated in Masyaf district, to provide power and pumped water to 11,000 nearby residents.
On January 22, Syrian Arab Republic Radio resumed nationwide broadcasting.
On January 23, the first Turkish Airlines flight from Turkey to Syria landed into Damascus International Airport.
On January 23, engineers at the Baniyas refinery confirmed that all maintenance and repair works had been completed and that the facility’s capacity now stood at 90,000 barrels per day.
On January 23, a solar cell array was installed and initiated in rural Homs, supplying three villages with power and pumped water supplies.

3. Security

Counter-Terrorism and Internal Security Operations

A January 24 report, "U.S. begins intel sharing with Syria's HTS-led transition", revealed that US intelligence provided a tip-off to the HTS-linked General Security Service (GSS), leading to the foiling of an ISIS plot to attack a shrine in Sayyida Zeinab, Damascus, on January 11. This marked direct engagement between US military and intelligence officers and HTS on counter-ISIS efforts, with SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi present in at least one meeting at al-Dumayr Airbase.
On January 21, Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra insisted that DMO forces were securing areas where ISIS is active, such as the Palmyra and al-Sukhna desert.
On January 22, ISIS militants ambushed an oil tanker driving outside the village of al-Makman on the main road linking Hasakeh and Raqqa, heavily damaging it.
On January 22, ISIS militants ambushed DMO forces – commanded by Burhan Jarallah – in the desert outside Palmyra.
On January 24, the SDF announced that two ISIS operatives had been detained in a targeted raid in the town of Khasham in eastern Deir ez Zour.
On January 23, a wanted regime loyalist operative formerly associated with Air Force Intelligence, identified as Said Mardini, was detained by DMO forces in a targeted raid in the Rukn al-Din district of Damascus.
On January 22, DMO forces captured a former regime informant, Ayman Tafi, in Aleppo city’s al-Sukkari district, accused of complicity in large-scale arrests and disappearances.
On January 22, an alleged regime informant, Bassel Haraba, accused of denouncing citizens for detention, was detained by GSS forces in a targeted raid in Latakia city.
On January 23, DMO forces launched a large-scale search operation looking for regime loyalists in Baniyas, Tartus.
On January 23, DMO forces continued search operations in rural Homs, discovering and seizing another large regime weapons depot in the Thabatiyah area east of Homs city, containing large quantities of landmines and ammunition.
On January 23, DMO forces launched a targeted raid on a residential building in Deir ez Zour city’s al-Sina district, discovering a cache of assault rifles and ammunition.
Beginning late on January 23 and continuing into January 24, GSS forces launched a series of coordination search operations and raids in al-Kiswah, Rif Dimashq, looking for regime loyalists, drug smugglers, and weapons.
On January 24, a regime Military Intelligence officer, identified as Hossam Qobati, accused of coordinating multiple assassinations, was captured by DMO forces in a raid on a residential building in Izraa, Daraa.

Inter-Factional Conflict and Territorial Control

A January 22 report, "Approaching Zero Hour – Can Syria unify & avoid major conflict with the SDF?", detailed that Turkey and its Syrian National Army (SNA) proxies had engaged in increasingly intense conflict with the SDF in northern and eastern Aleppo, particularly around the Tishreen Dam and the M4 highway bridge at Qere Qozaq.
On January 22, several Turkish drone strikes targeted SDF frontline positions at the Tishreen Dam, with local reporting claiming several civilian casualties.
On January 22, Turkish aircraft conducted at least seven strikes on SDF positions in the villages of Beir Hisu and al-Tinah in the Kobani countryside.
On January 22, SNA forces launched a renewed push towards SDF frontline positions around Tel Syriatel on the approach to the Tishreen Dam, triggering a day of heavy clashes in which multiple combatants were killed.
On January 22, SNA forces launched a small-scale cross-line incursion towards SDF positions along the Deir Hafer frontline in eastern Aleppo, triggering heavy fighting and a wave of SDF suicide drone attacks in the nearby village of al-Imam.
On January 23, several SNA and SDF fighters were killed in heavy fighting outside Manbij and Deir Hafer. During the clashes, the SDF launched multiple suicide drones at Turkish military and allied SNA posts and vehicles. Several Turkish airstrikes also targeted SDF frontline positions near the Tishreen Dam, while Turkish artillery strikes hit SDF posts in Beir Ramej and al-Quri, west of Kobani.
On January 24, Turkish airstrikes targeted SDF frontline positions along the Tishreen Dam frontline, amidst continued clashes between SNA and SDF fighters, along with tit-for-tat artillery shelling.
On January 22, a Turkish drone strike targeted an SDF checkpoint in the village of al-Latka north of Raqqa.
On January 22, DMO forces expanded into Raqqa’s southern desert, taking control of the al-Zamla oil wells that had previously been under SDF control.
Later on January 22, DMO forces also advanced – without any fighting – into the formerly SDF-controlled town of Abu al-Tabat, east of Raqqa.
On January 23, the DMO confirmed that its forces were now stationed within 50km of Tabqa city, and that all villages and oil wells in Raqqa’s desert were now under government control, except for those in the Rusafa area. The DMO added that oil wells in the deserts of Hama, Homs, Aleppo, and western Deir ez Zour were now also in government control.
On January 22, tribal gunmen in SDF-controlled rural Raqqa issued a video statement announcing the formation of the “Revolutionary Military Council” to forcefully expel the SDF from the region.
On January 22, four combatants were injured during heavy clashes that began when anti-SDF tribal militiamen ambushed an SDF patrol in the town of al-Junaynah in western Deir ez Zour.
On January 22, eight men were detained by SDF forces during a large-scale search operation launched to capture anti-SDF tribal militiamen in the towns of Dhiban, al-Shuheil, and Shinan in eastern Deir ez Zour.
On January 23, SDF forces detained at least 10 suspected regime loyalists in the towns of al-Junaynah and al-Jaya.
On January 24, several civilians were injured when SDF fighters opened fire on a group of men passing by the Suwaydan crossing along the Euphrates in eastern Deir ez Zour.
On January 24, Turkish military artillery shelling targeted SDF positions in the countryside outside Tel Abyad and Abu Rasin, Hasakeh.
On January 21, local gunmen in the village of al-Shaab in southeastern Suwayda announced the formation of a new militia dedicated to combating both drug smuggling and ISIS.

Civilian Casualties and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)

On January 21, two female civilians were killed and seven other civilians (including four children) were injured in SDF artillery shelling that struck the village of Tel Arsh outside Manbij, Aleppo. Local reporting and an investigation by the Syrian Civil Defense (White Helmets) claimed 9M22S incendiary thermite munitions were used.
On January 21, one female civilian was killed in SDF shelling that struck the village of Jarn al-Kabir in eastern Aleppo.
On January 21, one DMO fighter was killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in an undisclosed location in rural Idlib.
On January 21, one child was injured after his livestock triggered an unexploded landmine outside the village of al-Malaja, Idlib, killing at least 10 sheep.
On January 21, one SNA fighter was killed when an unexploded landmine he was attempting to defuse detonated in Aleppo’s northern countryside.
On January 21, four civilians were injured in an SDF suicide drone strike on a school in the village of Rasm al-Mastaha in eastern Aleppo.
On January 21, one civilian was injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of Harbel in northern Aleppo.
On January 21, several people were injured in a small car bomb explosion in Manbij.
On January 21, one DMO fighter was killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of Ako in the Jabal al-Akrad region, Latakia.
On January 21, one man, identified as Mousab al-Mustafa, was killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of Qubeitat al-Asi in southern Hama.
On January 21, one man was killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of al-Mansoura west of Raqqa.
On January 22, one combatant was injured in clashes that erupted between rival tribes in the al-Mashliyb district of Raqqa city.
On January 22, three men were injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the desert outside Kabajeb in southern Deir ez Zour.
On January 23, one DMO fighter was killed after an unexploded landmine he was attempting to defuse detonated outside the village of Hazarin in southern Idlib.
On January 23, one civilian was killed and four others were injured when a car bomb detonated in the western suburbs of Manbij, Aleppo.
On January 23, three children were injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of al-Kharabah near Manbij, Aleppo.
On January 23, one young child was killed and six other civilians were injured in SDF shelling that struck the Tanak displacement camp in Jarablus, Aleppo.
On January 23, three civilians were injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine outside the village of Ayn al-Ghazal, Latakia.
On January 23, three civilians were killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of al-Sahl in the Qalamoun region, Rif Dimashq.
On January 23, three civilians – including two young girls – were killed and two others were injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine on the road between the villages of Kabajeb and Huwayjat Saqr, Deir ez Zour.
On January 23, seven young boys were injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded munition in the al-Joura district of Deir ez Zour city.
On January 24, one man was killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine outside the village of al-Arimah in eastern Aleppo.
On January 24, one man was injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine outside the village of al-Kawikli in eastern Aleppo.
On January 24, one child was injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine outside the village of Mazrat al-Nama’t in eastern Aleppo.
On January 24, one man was injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the Ithriyah area of eastern Hama.
On January 24, one man, identified as Baraa al-Rukaybat, was killed after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of al-Shakousiya in eastern Hama.
On January 24, one civilian was killed and another injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded landmine in the village of al-Kawm in eastern Homs.
On January 24, one man was injured after accidentally triggering an unexploded munition in the village of Hamar al-Kasra in western Deir ez Zour.
On January 24, one civilian was shot and severely injured in an attack by unidentified gunmen in Daraa al-Balad.

Regime Loyalist Resistance and DMO Response

On January 21, two DMO fighters were killed and three injured in an attack on the al-Sina checkpoint by regime loyalists in Jableh, Latakia.
On January 24, speculation – based on a sarcastic social media post – that Maher al-Assad had returned to Syria triggered regime loyalists to take to the streets and launch heavy gunfire into the air in Latakia. Dozens were subsequently detained by DMO and GSS forces.
Later on January 24, a surge in online threats against the interim government developed, and regime loyalists launched a number of attacks in Latakia. One man threw several grenades at a DMO post in Latakia city before being captured. A cell of loyalist gunmen launched a brief drive-by attack on a DMO checkpoint in the al-Mazira area of Latakia city, causing no casualties. Another cell launched an assault rifle attack on the DMO-run military academy in Jableh, but were repelled and killed.
On January 24, one DMO fighter was killed in an attack by regime loyalists on a patrol in Baniyas, Tartus, likely sparked by the false news about Maher al-Assad.
Local reporting on January 23 reported that approximately 20 men were captured and executed and “dozens” of others were detained and/or injured by DMO forces during a raid in the village of Fahil, Homs. Reports from their funerals subsequently identified 15 as regime military officers, including seven Generals. The interim government later announced on January 24 that an investigation had been launched into the incident and that “a number of suspects” had been “arrested and referred to the competent judiciary.”
On January 24, interim governor of Homs, Dr. Abdulrahman al-Aama, visited Fahil and neighboring Maryamin to “listen to the residents demands and work to address them.”
On January 23, one regime loyalist accused of involvement in several sectarian massacres in rural Homs in 2012 was captured and executed by unidentified gunmen.
On January 23, five alleged regime loyalists were detained by DMO forces during a raid on a farm in the village of al-Kanisah, Homs.
On January 23, three alleged regime loyalists were detained by DMO forces during a raid in the village of Tarin, Homs.
On January 23, at least 24 alleged regime loyalists were detained by DMO forces during a series of raids in the village of Kafrnaan, Homs.
On January 24, one regime loyalist and aide to recently killed warlord Shujaa al-Ali, Imad Mousa, was captured by DMO forces in rural western Homs.
On January 24, unidentified gunmen launched a raid on the village of Fahil in western rural Homs, taking a large number of men prisoner and allegedly killing several others.
On January 24, two DMO fighters – one of them a commander – were killed when regime loyalists ambushed his patrol in the Talkalakh area of western Homs.
On January 22, the DMO announced in Daraa that former regime military and security force personnel had until the end of January 23 to settle their status with the interim government, after which they would face full prosecution.
On January 23, the newly appointed head of police in Sheikh Miskeen, identified as Mohammed al-Safadi, was shot dead by unidentified gunmen while driving his car on the main road between Sheikh Miskeen and Izraa, Daraa. DMO forces subsequently launched a large-scale search operation, during which they detained one suspect.
On January 23, two local gunmen were killed and another was injured after being ambushed by a group of unidentified militiamen seeking to steal weapons left inside the 15th Brigade base east of Inkhil, Daraa.

On January 21, a Qatari cargo plane carrying humanitarian aid landed into Damascus International Airport.
On January 21, a Kuwaiti cargo plane carrying humanitarian aid landed into Damascus International Airport.
On January 23, a Qatari cargo plane carrying humanitarian aid landed into Damascus International Airport.
On January 23, a Saudi cargo plane carrying 30 tonnes of humanitarian aid landed into Damascus International Airport.
On January 23, Syria’s Embassy in Jordan announced that more than 15,000 “transit tickets” had been issued to Syrian families intending to leave Jordan to return to Syria.
On January 23, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi said approximately 210,000 Syrian refugees had returned to Syria since Assad’s departure on December 8, and that informal polling indicated at least 30% of refugees planned to return.
On January 21, one man accused of sheltering regime loyalists was attacked on the streets by locals and injured in Aleppo city’s al-Hamdaniyah district.
On January 24, one man, identified as Mustafa Sabbagh, was kidnapped by unidentified gunmen from the Sayf al-Dawla district of Aleppo city. His executed corpse was discovered the following day.
On January 21, unidentified gunmen kidnapped a school teacher from the “IT Academy” in Suwayda city.
On January 21, a female professor, Rasha al-Ali, was kidnapped by unidentified gunmen in Homs city.
On January 21, the body of one man, showing signs of torture and execution, was discovered in the al-Waer district of Homs city.
On January 22, one man, identified as Ibrahim Ajaj (a former photographer for regime-managed news agency SANA), was shot dead by unidentified assassins in Hama city. The Ministry of Information condemned the “assassination” and insisted an investigation was underway.
On January 22, one man was kidnapped and later executed by unidentified gunmen in an attack in the village of Tel Abdulaziz northeast of Salamiyah, Hama.
On January 24, one young man was shot dead by unidentified gunmen while standing outside the al-Amouri Hospital in Hama city.
Suspected regime loyalists severed two telecommunications cables running between Damascus and Homs late on January 23, interrupting internet service in the capital and surrounding areas until midday on January 24, when repairs were completed.

Military and Security Force Developments

On January 21, Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra added that more than 70 military factions had now engaged successfully with talks to integrate them into a new Syrian armed forces, while “a committee of officers from diverse backgrounds is drafting the new Syrian Army structure.”
On January 22, at least 400 new recruits to the DMO graduated from training in Deir ez Zour.
On January 24, DMO Coast Guard forces conducted maritime patrols off the coast of Tartus.
On January 21, the first contingent of 300 newly trained Public Security forces graduated in Daraa and began their service.

Relevant Context

The ongoing negotiations between the HTS-led transitional government in Damascus and the SDF in northeast Syria represent a critical juncture for the country's post-Assad future. The SDF, a multi-ethnic, Kurdish-led force, has controlled significant territory and oil resources in the northeast since its formation with US backing to fight ISIS. Its demand to retain a distinct "military bloc" within a new Syrian army reflects its desire for continued autonomy and security guarantees, a position that clashes with the transitional government's insistence on full dissolution of all armed factions into a unified national army to prevent future fragmentation and warlordism, a lesson drawn from past reconciliation models like the "Daraa model." The outcome of these talks will determine the future stability and territorial integrity of Syria, with significant implications for the presence of US forces and the ongoing fight against ISIS.

The reported US intelligence sharing with the HTS-led General Security Service (GSS) marks an extraordinary shift in international engagement with Syria's transitional authorities. Historically, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the dominant force behind the transitional government, was designated a terrorist organization due to its origins as Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda's former affiliate in Syria. However, HTS has actively disassociated from al-Qaeda and has a documented history of aggressively targeting both al-Qaeda and ISIS elements within its areas of control since 2017. This new level of direct intelligence cooperation suggests a pragmatic recognition by the US of HTS's effectiveness in counter-terrorism operations and its pivotal role in the post-Assad landscape, particularly as the future of the SDF's autonomous entity becomes increasingly uncertain. This collaboration underscores the shared priority of combating ISIS, whose resurgence in Syria has been a growing concern.

18-24 Jan 2025